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THE NATURE OF PRECEDENT
EARL MALTZt
Many current legal scholars argue that factors other than stare de-
cisis are, or should be, the prime motivators in judicial decision making.
Though contrary to traditional legal precepts, these arguments have
gained widespread acceptance. In this Article Professor Maltz examines
the role that precedent plays in judicial decision making. The Article
first examines the theoretical justifications for relying on precedent and
then sets forth an analytical framework against which the precedential
value of a case may be measured. Professor Maltz thereby offers an
alternative rationale for the role of precedent which permits competing
societal influences to be reconciled with stare decisis.
In contemporary legal scholarship, one fashionable trend is to denigrate the
importance of precedent in judicial decision making. Numerous commentators
have noted that judges' decisions essentially are political and are influenced by
many of the same considerations as those of other governmental actors. Some of
these commentators argue that if one wishes to truly understand the nature of
the judicial process, she should concentrate on these common political consider-
ations, rather than the vagaries of what is generally described as "legal
reasoning." 1
Few would argue that the actions of courts are not affected profoundly by
the basic political/moral culture in which the courts operate. An important
tenet of our political/moral culture, however, is that judges should feel strongly
constrained by prior case law. The result of the influence of this tenet is that the
doctrine of stare decisis does in fact have a profound influence on judicial deci-
sion making. Virtually every opinion is replete with references to decided cases.
In some situations the opinion will consist almost entirely of such citations; in
other cases, judges will engage in complicated reasoning to analogize or distin-
guish established authority. In any event, even a cursory reading of the reports
reveals that reliance on precedent is one of the distinctive features of the Ameri-
can judicial system.
This Article investigates the manner in which precedent operates to influ-
ence the decisions of judges.2 The Article explores the values that are served by
t Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). B.A. 1972, Northwestern University; J.D. 1975,
Harvard University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Rudy Peritz. Responsibil-
ity for all errors remains my own.
1. See, e.g., Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984);
Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 1383.
2. E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948). K. LLEWELLYN, THE COM-
MON LAW TRADITION (1960), and Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of
Binding Precedent, in OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 148 (A. Guest ed. 1961), are perceptive
general studies of the concepts of precedent in the American and British systems, respectively. R.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 240-50 (1986), R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110-115
(1977), R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICA-
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emphasizing prior case law in the decision making process. It then examines the
factors that influence the scope of precedent. Finally, the Article discusses the
conditions under which prior case law can be overruled.
I. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FOLLOWING PRECEDENT
3
A. Certainty and Reliance
The most commonly heard justification for the doctrine of stare decisis rests
on the need for certainty in the law.4 In planning their affairs, it is argued,
people should be able to predict the legal consequences of their actions. Such
predictability can only be obtained if judges can be expected to follow precedent
in making their decisions.
Admittedly, any change in the law will generate some social costs as af-
fected parties adjust their behavior. These costs are often overstated, however;
many certainty-related problems relate not to the fact that a precedent is over-
ruled, but rather to the technique used by the overruling court.
This point emerges most clearly when the argument of certainty is pressed
by one who has actually relied on existing law.5 Suppose, for example, that a
party to a contract (P) knows that in the past the courts have interpreted a
particular term in a manner favorable to him. He then bargains to have that
term included in the contract, giving up other points in the process. If the
courts were later to interpret the relevant term in a manner unfavorable to P,
one might well argue that his justified expectations have been defeated.
The difficulty with this argument is that it relates to the timing of change in
law rather than the fact of change itself. As an illustration of the point, consider
the action of the Michigan Supreme Court in Parker v. Port Huron Hospital.6 In
Parker the court abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, which had pre-
vailed in the state since the decision in Downes v. Harper Hospital.7 Challenging
the decision to overrule Downes, one might well conclude that charitable institu-
tions planned their activities and budgets with the assumption that they would
TION (1961), Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REV. 495 (1985), and
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 So. CAL. L. REV. 277, 359-376 (1985), seek to
determine the ideal role for precedent in the judicial system. Writings such as Bennett, Objectivity in
Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 480-89 (1984), Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L.
REV. 735 (1949), Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982), Kel-
man, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 227, Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467, Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court
Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979), and Stevens, The Life-Span of a Judge.Made Rule, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1983), focus on the role of case law in the Supreme Court. Finally, Easterbrook,
supra, Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986), and Maltz, The Concept
of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 357 (1982), discuss the problems
created by the phenomenon of multimember courts.
3. Other perceptive discussions of this problem include R. WASSERSSTROM, supra note 2, ch.
4, and Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
4. See, e.g., R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 2, at 68-70; Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis:
Concerning Prjudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 200 (1933).
5. Wasserstrom draws a sharp distinction between arguments based on certainty and those
based on reliance. See R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 2, at 60-69.
6. 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
7. 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42 (1894).
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be immune from tort liability. Based on the same assumptions, these institutions
may have failed to obtain liability insurance. Thus, the argument would con-
clude, Parker was wrongly decided because it defeated the justified expectations
of the institutions relying on the Downes rule.
The force of the argument is dramatically reduced, however, when one real-
izes that the Michigan court explicitly limited the effect of Parker to causes of
action arising after the decision was filed. Charitable institutions are certainly
entitled to base their actions only on the law that is currently in effect. Once
Parker overruled Downes, the rule in Michigan became that charities were not
immune from tort liability. At that time, institutions were no more entitled to
rely on Downes than on some legislative enactment superseded by later law.
Thus, since the Parker rule was made prospective only in application, the values
of certainty and reliance suffered little damage.
Of course, the defendant in Parker itself may have relied on the Downes
precedent to its detriment. Fear of damage to the expectations of a single de-
fendant, however, hardly seems a sufficient reason to retain a rule that will be
unjust in a wide range of cases. Moreover, if the protection of justified expecta-
tions is deemed a paramount consideration, the remedy is not to require that the
unjust precedent remain intact, but rather to make the announcement of a new
rule entirely prospective-a practice which, although rare, is not unknown.8 In
short, unless one is willing to require that judicial decisions be retrospective in
operation, arguments based on the need to preserve the certainty of individual
rules have little force as justifications for the doctrine of stare decisis.
B. Equality
A second common defense of stare decisis holds that the use of precedent is
necessary to ensure that similarly situated litigants are treated equally. 9 In order
to analyze this argument, one must carefully define the concept of "equality."
Any two cases will differ in some respect-if only in the identity of the litigants
involved. The question thus becomes what types of equality are important.' 0
Virtually all would agree that two incidents adjudicated by the same court,
occurring in the same place and at the same time, and arising out of facts which
are identical except for the identity of the litigants, should be treated equally.
Conversely, it is also clear that society views with equanimity the possibility that
rights will change over time. Legislation presents a classic illustration. For ex-
ample, when a state legislature replaces the Uniform Sales Act with Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), no one would find it strange that the
Uniform Sales Act governs one case while the UCC controls later litigation.
With this example in mind, it becomes clear that, as in the problem of cer-
tainty, the problem of equality actually relates to the issue of retroactivity rather
8. For a more elaborate defense of the practice of prospective overruling, see R. KEETON,
VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 25-53 (1969).
9. See R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 2, at 69-72.
10. See generally Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (arguing
that rhetoric of equality should be abandoned because it causes confusion and logical errors).
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than to the role of precedent generally. So long as a decision is prospective only,
one is faced with a situation analogous to the replacement of the Uniform Sales
Act by the UCC. In the Parker situation, for example, different hospitals would
face differing liability rules depending on the time in which the relevant conduct
took place. Certainly one would not find anything amiss if this difference were
the result of prospective legislative action. Similarly, substantial issues regard-
ing unjustly unequal treatment arise only when an overruling decision is given
retroactive effect.
C. Efficiency
The doctrine of stare decisis often is defended on the ground that it pro-
motes judicial efficiency. Justice Cardozo, for example, argued that "the labor
of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision
could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone
before him."'" Despite the facial appeal of this argument, a closer analysis un-
dermines much of its persuasive force.
First, the degree to which reliance on precedent actually eases the rigors of
judicial decision making can easily be overstated. Admittedly, in most cases
judges will be freed from the burden of directly reexamining the policy justifica-
tions underlying particular rules of law. In place of this reexamination, how-
ever, the courts are faced with the duty of determining which potentially
applicable precedent is most nearly like the case at bar-a process that presents
its own difficulties. Moreover, because the American doctrine of stare decisis is
not an absolute, inflexible rule, another potentially complicating factor is intro-
duced into the judicial decision making process: in some situations advocates
will argue a particular precedent should be overruled. In such cases the court
will not only reexamine the reasons underlying the adoption of a particular rule
of law, but also determine whether countervailing concerns are sufficient to out-
weigh the force of the concept of precedent itself. In those situations, rather
than simplifying the judicial process, the doctrine of stare decisis actually adds
an additional level of complexity.
Nonetheless, the ability to rely on precedent no doubt simplifies the task of
judging. But efficiency alone cannot justify the prominence of stare decisis in the
Anglo-American system. In essence, the argument for efficiency is based on the
proposition that it is better to decide cases quickly than correctly. As Wasser-
strom points out, if this truly were the primary goal of the system then one
would adopt a method such as flipping coins and eliminate the rigors of legal
reasoning entirely.12 Thus, while the promotion of efficient decision making is
11. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1925). See also Florida Dep't
of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 154 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (inter-
est in facilitating the labors of judges is not insubstantial); R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 2, at 72-74
(considered as one justification for the model of precedent, the argument for efficiency is both plausi-
ble and persuasive); Radin, supra note 4, at 200 ("[I]f precedents are followed the law is more readily
discoverable than if they are not.").
12. R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 2, at 73.
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one advantage of relying on precedent, other forces also must be at work.
D. The Appearance of Justice and the Avoidance of Arbitrary
Decision Making
One of the most widely shared values in the American political system is
that principles governing society should be "rules of law and not merely the
opinions of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high office." 13 The
doctrine of stare decisis reinforces this value in two ways. First, it fosters the
appearance of certainty and impartiality by providing a seemingly neutral source
of authority to which judges can appeal in order to justify their decisions. Sec-
ond, the influence of precedent works to limit the actual impact which any single
judge (or small group of judges) has on the shape of the law.
If appearance alone were the criterion, the doctrine of stare decisis primar-
ily would affect the form of judicial opinions rather than the actual content of
the decisions made. As any law student knows, virtually any judicial decision
can be analogized to or distinguished from any other fact pattern. 1 4 Therefore,
if preserving the veneer of certainty and impartiality for public consumption
were the major concerns, judges simply would reach their decisions indepen-
dently and then write opinions justifying those decisions in terms of preexisting
case law.15
Predictably, one can find any number of decisions that appear to reflect this
phenomenon.1 6 However, one also can identify many cases in which precedent
actually seems to influence the result. The continuing influence of stare decisis
reflects the fact that even in a post-Realist world, society expects judges in some
significant sense to be lawfinders rather than lawmakers. As members of society,
judges themselves have by and large internalized this view. Their training as
lawyers reinforces this perception of the judicial role. Thus, because judges be-
lieve that law should be made by reference to "neutral" principles of precedent,
those principles in fact have a strong influence on decision making.
17
One might argue that in reality, the doctrine of stare decisis simply trans-
fers plenary decision making authority from one potentially arbitrary individ-
13. Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 154 (1981) (Stevens,
J., concurring); see also Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652 (1895) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one hedged about by prece-
dents that are binding on the court without regard to the personality of its members.").
14. See Radin, The Method of Law, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 471, 484.
15. Cf. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 411, 424-25
(1981) (court should decide cases in manner calculated to advance socialism and disguise and couch
decisions in legalistic rhetoric).
16. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (court held plaintiff's constitutional rights
were not violated as a result of the distribution of a flyer of "active shoplifters," including plaintiff's
photograph and name, when plaintiff was arrested for shoplifting, but the charges were subsequently
dismissed) with Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (court held unconstitutional a
Wisconsin statute authorizing the posting of notices in retail liquor outlets prohibiting gifts or sales
of liquor to persons determined to have caused neglect to their families or to be a potential threat to
the peace, without notice or hearing to such persons).
17. For an interesting exchange debating the process of this internalization, compare Fiss, Ob-
jectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (1982), with Fish, Fish i: Fiss, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1325, 1326 (1984).
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ual-the contemporary judge-to another-the predecessor judge who
generated the relevant precedent.1 3 If the doctrine of stare decisis were absolute
and the application of precedent a simple, mechanical matter, then this com-
plaint might be justified. However, judges are in fact informed by extrinsic val-
ues in their application of preexisting case law to new situations. Moreover, if
the relevant case law is sufficiently antithetical to the judge's values, she can in
some cases simply overturn prior law. The result is that the overall pattern of
the law reflects a blend of the value systems of both past and present judges,
leaving room for both continuity and change.
In short, the most convincing explanation for the prominence of precedent
in American jurisprudence is simply that the concept of stare decisis reflects
very basic notions about the proper function of judges in the lawmaking process.
In order to understand more fully the influence of precedent, two sets of issues
must be addressed. The first set involves the scope of the impact of any given
holding on the decisions in later cases. The second set of issues involves the
circumstances under which precedents are to be abandoned. The remainder of
this Article discusses these two sets of issues.
II. THE SCOPE OF A PRECEDENT
Typically, the holding in a particular case (the "precedent case") is said to
control the result in all future cases in which the facts are similar to the prece-
dent case in all relevant respects.19 Unfortunately, this description alone is not
very helpful. As already noted, all cases will be similar to the precedent case in
some respects; conversely; any case could be distinguished from the precedent
case on some factual ground. Thus, one must determine which differences are
relevant and which are not.
An uncontrovertible answer to the question of which factual differences are
relevant to a case's precedential impact cannot be obtained until the precedent
case is actually interpreted by later courts. 20 To a certain degree, however, the
potential impact of a case as precedent will be determined at the time the rele-
vant decision is rendered. Traditionally, discussion of this point has focused on
distinctions between the concepts of holding, ratio decidendi, and dictum.2' A
18. See R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 2, at 78-79.
19. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1577 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
20. See Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553, 1555 (1974).
21. See, e.g., R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 35-102 (1968). For a debate concerning
the proper method of determining the ratio decidendi of a case see Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of
a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117 (1959) (attempting to clarify the theory he expressed in his 1930
article, in light of the debate between Montrose and Simpson); Goodhart, Determining the Ratio
Decidendiofa Case, 40 YALE L.J. 61 (1930) (establishing what Montrose and Simpson later referred
to as the "Goodhart theory"); Montrose, Ratio Decidendi and the House of Lords, 21 MOD. L. REV,
124 (1957) (defending the "classical view," which he believed Goodhart had controverted, that "the
ratio was the principle of law which the judge considered necessary to the decision); Montrose, The
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 587 (1957) (disagreeing with Simpson's characteriza-
tion of Goodhart's theory as "indistinguishable from the classical theory"); Simpson, The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 453 (1959) (rejecting Goodhart's sentiment, expressed in his
later article, that "there may be a divergence between the rule of law enunciated by a judge as
governing his decision, and a rule which is constructed by ascertaining the facts which the judge
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more useful taxonomy, however, distinguishes three different factors that are
critical in determining the impact of a decision: general doctrine, specific doc-
trine, and the rationale of the decision.
A. General Doctrine
When determining the scope of a precedent case, the first touchstone is
identification of those principles which can be defined as general doctrine. Gen-
eral doctrine includes a variety of conventions, each of which embodies some
assumptions concerning the use of language or the proper functioning of the
courts in the overall lawmaking process. All of these conventions share a single
distinguishing feature: rather than drawing their force from the specific prece-
dent case, they rely on basic postulates that govern the system as a whole. Often
these postulates are so deeply ingrained that they remain unarticulated in judi-
cial opinions. Nonetheless, when a principle of general doctrine is clearly appli-
cable, it typically will settle the issue of a particular precedent's relevance.
The principles governing the effect of cases interpreting written authori-
ties-statutes and constitutions-provide a prominent example of general doc-
trine. Certain linguistic conventions require that the principles governing one
group of cases also be applied to other groups defined by the relevant document.
Conversely, a related set of conventions limits the precedential effect of statutory
or constitutional case law.
In a statutory context, the development of the law under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 22 clearly reflects the influence of these linguistic con-
ventions. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 23 the United States Supreme Court held
that even without discriminatory intent, absent a showing of "business neces-
sity" Title VII barred an employer from using any employment criterion that
disqualified a disproportionate percentage of blacks.24 The decision in Griggs
was supported in large measure by reference to race-specific factors. A large
part of the Court's rationale was the assumption that the inability of blacks to
compete effectively on the test at issue was the result of widespread past, inten-
tional, racial discrimination. 25 Nonetheless, six years later, the Court with little
discussion unanimously held the Griggs disparate impact standard applicable to
sex discrimination in Dothard v. Rawlinson 2 6--- a challenge to a requirement that
prison guards be of a certain height and weight.27 Moreover, on this point the
Dothard decision attracted the support of a number of Justices who in other
considered to be material and the conclusion based upon them"); Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a
Case, 21 MOD L. REV. 155 (1958) (explaining Simpson's 1957 article); Simpson, The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 413 (1957) (characterizing Goodhart's theory as "indistin-
guishable from the classical theory" and, therefore, subject to the same criticism Goodhart and
others had directed at the classical theory). For a less heated discussion of this topic see Stone, The
Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597 (1959).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
24. Id. at 431.
25. Id. at 430-31.
26. 433 U.S. 321 (1979).
27. Id. at 323-24.
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contexts had shown themselves hostile to claims of sex discrimination and the
concept of impact analysis generally.28
The key to understanding Dothard lies in an examination of the structure of
Title VII itself. The same section of the statute prohibits discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of both race and sex. Given this parallel structure, gen-
eral doctrines of judicial linguistic analysis require that discrimination be defined
in the same way with respect to both protected groups. Thus, once the Griggs
Court had decreed that disparate racial impact raised a presumption that use of
an employment criterion was illegal under the statute, the same presumption
necessarily applied to criteria with a sexually disparate impact.
In Dothard, linguistic conventions operated to expand the scope of a Title
VII precedent. By contrast, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,29 related
aspects of general doctrine worked to limit the impact of judicial decisions. Es-
pinoza involved a claim that Title VII prohibited employers from discriminating
on the basis of alienage.30 Plaintiff claimed that the explicit statutory prohibi-
tion on discrimination based on "national origin" was intended to cover discrim-
ination against aliens generally. 31 Rejecting this claim, eight Justices of the
Court, including some normally sympathetic to claims of alien rights, held Title
VII inapplicable to the relevant discrimination. 32
On one level, Espinoza can be viewed as a simple exercise in determining
the intent of the legislature-an exercise governed largely by general legal con-
ventions. The case can also be seen, however, as presenting the question of
whether the resolution of claims resting on alienage-based discrimination should
be governed by the same standards that determine the outcome in cases claiming
racial or sexual discrimination. In essence, the Espinoza Court held that the
race and sex precedents were not controlling-that because cases such as Griggs
and Dothard purported to rest on the authority of Title VII, the impact of those
cases was limited by the structure of the statute.33 Thus, the scope of a prece-
28. For example, Justice Stewart-the author of the majority opinion in Dothard-also wrote
for the Court in Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979), holding that
disparate sexual impact was insufficient to raise the level of scrutiny under the equal protection
clause. Similarly, although Justice Rehnquist was the only member of the Court to dissent from the
proposition that discrimination against women should be subjected to heightened constitutional
scrutiny, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), he explic-
itly accepted the basic concept of impact analysis in Dothard. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 337-40
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
29. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
30. Id. at 87.
31. Id. at 87-88.
32. Id. at 95-96. Justice Douglas alone dissented. Id. at 96-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. Admittedly, at times courts will refer to statutorily-created principles in deciding cases to
which the statute by its terms is clearly inapplicable. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375 (1970) (recovery for wrongful death allowed under federal maritime law, under which it
previously had not been allowed-wrongful death statutes applying in other circumstances as the
reason); Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common Law Cases, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 554 (1982) (urging the recognition by courts, lawyers, and law students that statutes
"have the potential to provide starting points from which judges may, in their discretion, reason in
developing common law"). The statutes and case law decided thereunder are not considered con-
trolling precedent in such situations; instead, they simply form part of the background from which
the court determines the relevant social values that will influence its decisions.
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dent was defined in large measure by general doctrinal concerns embodied in
linguistic conventions.
The same types of conventions have also strongly influenced some areas of
constitutional law. The state action problem provides a prime example. Under
generally accepted principles, the fourteenth amendment proscribes only actions
that can be attributed to the state. Purely private actions are left unaffected.
Not surprisingly, a large quantity of litigation has focused on the issue of
whether particular activities should be viewed as "state action" for constitu-
tional purposes. The decisions of the Supreme Court in this area have produced
a variety of seemingly irreconcilable results. One point emerges clearly, how-
ever. The Court plainly views state action as a unitary concept; that is, state
action analysis in connection with the due process clause is governed by pre-
cisely the same principles that govern state action analysis in connection with
the equal protection clause. For example, because the denial of a hearing by a
privately owned utility does not constitute state action, racial discrimination by
the same utility would not be barred by the fourteenth amendment.
34
A number of commentators have criticized the unitary approach.35 One
popular argument rests on the observation that the state is in some way involved
in virtually all state action controversies. Therefore, it is argued, the state action
decisions should be viewed as implicitly resolving a conflict between the chal-
lenged practice and the asserted right to be free from that practice. Because
some practices are more odious than others, the degree of state involvement
required to bring those practices within the reach of fourteenth amendment con-
straints should be correspondingly lower. For example, the public utility's de-
nial of a hearing might not be considered state action, but racial discrimination
by the same utility could nonetheless constitute state action and therefore be
subject to fourteenth amendment constraints.
In order to analyze this argument, one first must recognize that the ques-
tion of whether to abandon the unitary approach revolves around the concept of
precedent. The issue is whether the decision in a race discrimination case, for
example, should control a later procedural due process case, and vice versa.
Further, as in the Title VII cases, the state action litigation involves the interpre-
tation of a written source of law-in this case, the fourteenth amendment. And
just as the same clause of Title VII connects the term "discrimination" with
both "race" and "sex,"'36 the same constitutional clause connects "[n]o State
shall" with "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law" and "deny to any person.., the equal protection of the laws." 37 Thus,
the same linguistic conventions which required the Court to apply the Griggs
standards in Dothard support the unitary approach to state action cases.
34. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
35. See, e.g., Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State
Action"Requirement, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 221; Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial
Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1964).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
37. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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In short, general doctrine has a profound impact on the scope of many
precedents. In a large number of cases, however, simple reference to general
doctrine will not yield clear answers. In these situations, the next important
reference point is specific doctrine.
B. Specific Doctrine
Specific doctrine consists of the rule or rules of law that a court describes as
controlling the particular case before it. Typically, the specific doctrine involved
consists of two components. The first is a "breadth" component-a description
of the classes of cases to be governed by the legal rule enunciated. The second is
a "content" component-the nature of the legal standard itself. Obviously, each
component has important ramifications for the influence of the case as
precedent.
1. The Breadth Component
The influence of the breadth component on the power of a precedent is
illustrated by comparing the impact of Plyler v. Doe38 with that of Hampton v.
McConnell39 and Mills v. Duryee.40 Plyer was an equal protection challenge to
a Texas statute which declared that the children of resident undocumented
aliens were not entitled to a free public education. Applying an elevated level of
judicial scrutiny, the Supreme Court struck down the Texas statute. At the
same time, however, the scope component of the specific doctrine employed by
the opinion substantially diluted the value of the case as precedent. The major-
ity opinion indicated that the decision not to apply the deferential rational-basis
test was premised both on the specific identity of the disadvantaged class- chil-
dren of undocumented aliens-and the importance of the right to which they
were denied access-free public education. 4 1 Because the confluence of these
two factors will be quite rare, the impact of Plyler as a precedent is necessarily
extremely limited.
By contrast, the breadth of the doctrines announced in Hampton and Mills
substantially contributed to the impact of those decisions on the future course of
the law. Both cases involved the specific question of whether a plea of nil debet
constituted a good defense to an attempt to enforce the judgment of a court in
the courts of another jurisdiction. Holding that the plea was not a good defense,
Chief Justice Marshall stated the specific doctrine of Hampton in sweeping
terms:
[T]he judgment of a state court [has] the same credit, validity and ef-
fect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state
where it was pronounced, and... whatever pleas would be good to a
38. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
39. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818).
40. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
41. The Court found that by denying the children a basic education, the Texas statute imposed
"a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status." Plyler,
457 U.S. at 223-224.
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suit thereon in such state, and none others, [can] be pleaded in any
other court in the United States.42
By its terms, the Mills/Hampton doctrine controls every suit that seeks to
enforce a judgment from one state in the courts of another state. Thus, for ex-
ample, it no doubt had a strong impact on the resolution of Fauntleroy v. Lum.
43
Fauntleroy was a Mississippi action to enforce a Missouri judgment on a cotton
futures contract. In Mississippi, enforcement of such contracts was against a
strong public policy, embodied in a criminal statute; moreover, the Missouri
action had been based on a Mississippi contract, and defendant was a Mississippi
resident. Nonetheless, citing the Mills/Hampton doctrine, a majority of the
Supreme Court held that the Mississippi courts were required by the full faith
and credit clause to enforce the Missouri judgment.44
In short, the nature of the class defined by specific doctrinal rules plainly
has a major impact on the strength of the precedent creating the doctrine. The
impact of the precedent further depends in large measure on the precise content
of the legal principle adumbrated in the precedential case. The next subsection
examines the impact of the content component.
2. The Content Component
The degree to which the decision in a particular precedential case will con-
trol the outcome in later litigation depends largely on the concreteness of the
doctrine established in that case. Concrete standards leave later judges little
room to maneuver, making the doctrine itself the dominant force in the decision
making process. By contrast, vague doctrinal formulations do not, in and of
themselves, dictate results. Thus, courts in later cases will have more leeway to
consider other factors without damaging the basic concept of stare decisis.
The development of the constitutional constraints on quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion provides a prime illustration of this point. Pennoyer v. Neff4 5 initially estab-
lished the rule that a state might constitutionally seize any property within its
jurisdiction and use that seizure as a basis to adjudicate a claim against the
owner for the value of that property. Under Pennoyer, this rule applied even if
the basis of the claim was entirely unrelated to the property itself.46 In 1977, the
Court overruled Pennoyer, holding in Shaffer v. Heitner47 that henceforth quasi
in rem cases were to be governed by the standards set forth in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington.48 Thus, jurisdiction over an absent defendant can be sus-
tained only if the defendant "[has] certain minimum contacts with [the forum]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' -49
42. Hampton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 235.
43. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
44. Id. at 236-37.
45. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
46. Id. at 723.
47. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
48. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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The difference in impact between the Pennoyer and Shaffer doctrines is dra-
matic. Under the Pennoyer regime, doctrine dominated all constitutional chal-
lenges to quasi in rem jurisdiction. The only real question was whether property
existed within the forum state. Although that issue might be unclear in a small
minority of extremely marginal cases, 50 in most cases resolution of the issue
presented no problem. Thus, while still good law, Pennoyer effectively disposed
of all due process attacks on the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
By contrast, Shaffer alone decides almost none of these challenges. The
appeal to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" by its nature
directs the judge to consider each case individually, based on its own equities. In
controlling the outcome of future cases, Shaffer is a much less powerful prece-
dent than was Pennoyer.
This contrast should not be taken to suggest that a case such as Shaffer has
no impact on the development of subsequent case law. By announcing a new
legal standard Shaffer established the basic framework under which future quasi
in rem claims would be resolved. Moreover, together with later case law ad-
dressing the same issue, the decision on the specific factual situation in Shaffer
might form part of a pattern of results that would not be plausibly distinguish-
able from some later case before the Court. Thus, even a case based on some
vaguely formulated doctrine can influence later decisions in important ways.
Conversely, even the most concretely defined rules may not be totally dis-
positive of all later cases to which the doctrine is defined to be applicable. At
times such rules are intended to be subject to implicit limitations so familiar to
the precedential court that they are not mentioned in the relevant opinion.
When a later court finds that the case before it falls within one of these excep-
tions, the court will issue a decision seemingly at variance with the previously
announced doctrine.
The development of the law of full faith and credit provides an excellent
example of this phenomenon. The Hampton/Mills doctrine seems to clearly re-
quire that a state court recognize and enforce all judgments rendered by courts
of other states. Yet in Huntington v. Attril151 the Supreme Court carved out an
exception to this principle. Huntington involved an attempt to enforce a judg-
ment based on a statute that rendered the officers of a corporation liable for
corporate debts when they had signed and recorded a false certificate of the
amount of the capital stock of the corporation. Rather than simply citing the
Mills/Hampton doctrine to dispose of the case, the Court instead referred to the
"fundamental maxim of international law" that " '[t]he courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another.' ",52 Although it held that the particular stat-
ute at issue in Huntington did not constitute a penal law, the Court's opinion
50. See, e.g., Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966) (an
insurer's contractual indemnity on insured defendant is a debt owing to defendant and is subject to
attachment).
51. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
52. Id. at 666 (quoting The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825)).
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clearly stated that states were not required to give full faith and credit to penal
judgments of the courts of other states.
On its face the rule announced in Huntington might seem to be an impor-
tant change in the Mills/Hampton doctrine. In fact, however, Chief Justice
Marshall no doubt would have felt that the penal law exception was necessarily
implicit in his initial formulation of the principles governing full faith and credit
litigation. Indeed, it was he who stated the "fundamental maxim of interna-
tional law" upon which the Huntington Court relied. Because the maxim
plainly had no application in Mills or Hampton, he simply neglected to include
the penal law exception in his formulation of the general rule. Thus, rather than
being a modification of the original Mills/Hampton doctrine, the Huntington
exception was simply a gloss that accurately reflected the intentions of those
who formulated the original doctrine.
None of the foregoing analysis should obscure the basic principle that the
force of an individual precedent as a controller of later results depends on the
scope and concreteness of the doctrine established by the court in the relevant
opinion. As the analysis indicates, however, one must often look to other factors
to gain a clear understanding of the impact of the precedent. In many cases, the
impact of the doctrine will be modified by the rationale underlying the preceden-
tial decision.
C. Rationale
The rationale of a case is the reason given for adopting the specific doctrine
governing that case. Graham v. Richardson 5 3 illustrates the difference between
rationale and specific doctrine. In Graham, plaintiffs challenged a variety of
state rules limiting the access of aliens to welfare benefits.5 4 Striking down these
rules, the Supreme Court asserted that "classifications based on alienage.., are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a
prime example of a 'discrete and insular minority' for whom such heightened
judicial scrutiny is appropriate." 55 The doctrine established by Graham is that
alienage-based classifications are subject to close judicial scrutiny. The rationale
for adopting that doctrine is that aliens are a "discrete and insular minority."'56
Although not always so sharply distinguished by the courts, the two concepts
affect the force of precedents in quite different ways.
Rationales generally assume their greatest importance in situations in
which a party attempts to expand the doctrine of a particular case beyond the
limits defined by that case. One classic example is the demise of the concept of
privity in products liability cases. Initially, the general rule was that when a
consumer was injured by a defect in a product purchased from a retailer, the
nonnegligent manufacturer of the goods who sold those goods to the retailer for
resale was not liable for the injuries. Relatively early, however, the courts, recog-
53. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
54. Id. at 366-68.
55. Id. at 372 (citation omitted).
56. Id.
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nized an exception to this doctrine for injuries caused by adulterated food. 57
The rationale for creating such an exception often remained unstated; however,
the exception seemed to rest on the principle that "the consequences of eating
unsound food are so disastrous to human health and life, that the law imposes a
warranty of purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as a matter of public
policy."'58
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,59 the New Jersey Supreme Court
seized this rationale to expand the exceptions to the privity doctrine. Address-
ing a claim based on an alleged defect in an automobile, the court held the man-
ufacturer liable for injuries caused by such defects. 60 Citing cases involving
adulterated food, the court argued:
We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly
in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome
beverage may bring illness to one person, the defective car, with its
great potentiality for harm to the driver, occupants, and others, de-
mands even less adherence to the narrow barrier of privity.6t
At times the impact of a rationale can even override the dictates of appar-
ently clear specific doctrine. The development of the "market participant" ex-
ception in dormant commerce clause analysis provides a particularly forceful
example of the influence of rationale. Prior to 1976, a number of commerce
clause cases had established the doctrine that discrimination against out- of-state
commercial interests was either per se illegal or at the very least subject to the
strictest scrutiny. 62 In 1976 and 1980, respectively, the Court faced two cases
that seemed on their face to fall squarely within this rule. In Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp. 63 a Maryland program that paid bounties for wrecked cars
imposed greater documentation requirements on cars proffered by out-of-state
scrap yards;64 in Reeves, Inc. v. State65 a cement factory owned by the State of
South Dakota reserved its production for South Dakota customers.66 Each case
provided a clear example of state discrimination against out-of-state commerce.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found both schemes constitutional, holding
that the strictures of the dormant commerce clause did not apply when the dis-
criminating state was a "market participant" rather than a market regulator. 67
Both cases drew sharp dissents68 as well as generally unfavorable scholarly
57. See, e.g., Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410, 414-15, 118 N.E. 853, 854 (1918); Jacob E. Decker
& Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 614, 164 S.W.2d 828, 830 (1942).
58. Capps, 139 Tex. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
59. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
60. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
61. Id. at 382, 161 A.2d at 83 (citations omitted).
62. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978).
63. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
64. Id. at 796-99.
65. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
66. Id. at 432-33.
67. d. at 440; Hughes, 426 U.S. at 809-10.
68. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 447-454 (Powell, J., dissenting); Hughes, 426 U.S. at 817-32 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
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comment. 69 Established doctrine provided a primary theme for the criticism of
the decisions. Preexisting case law, it was argued, established without exception
the unconstitutionality of discrimination against out-of-state interests. Both
Hughes and Reeves involved such discrimination. Thus, the critics concluded,
both the Maryland and South Dakota plans should have been held to violate the
dormant commerce clause.
70
Both decisions are explicable, however, when the rationale behind the gen-
eral prohibition against discrimination is examined. Dormant commerce clause
analysis generally is intended to preserve the federal structure of the American
system. The requirement that states not adopt commercial regulations which
discriminate against outsiders is simply a specific incident of this more general
intention. Allowing states to provide benefits to their own citizenry without also
providing similar benefits to outsiders, however, is hardly inconsistent with
American federalism. Indeed, state responsibility for its own citizenry is one of
the core values of that federalism. Describing a state as a market participant is
essentially synonymous with saying that the state is providing a benefit. Viewed
from this perspective, Hughes and Reeves simply represent the triumph of the
rationale for a specific doctrine over the doctrine itself.
If only cases involving products liability and the commerce clause were ex-
amined, one might well overstate the importance of rationales in the develop-
ment of case law. In fact, courts are generally more likely to ignore or modify
the rationale of a prior case than the clear doctrine announced in that case. In
part, this tendency reflects the fact the rationale stated in an opinion is often
incomplete; the pressure of time and space constraints can preclude the full ex-
pression of the court's reasoning process. Thus, a judge often will content her-
self with giving the bare outline of her analysis, leaving subtleties and unstated
premises to be explored in situations in which they become relevant.
Of course, as the development of full faith and credit law demonstrates, the
same problem can afflict judges attempting to formulate doctrine. But in the
case of doctrine, basic notions of legal process intervene. Once a position is
clearly formulated as doctrine, only powerful considerations can move a future
court to ignore that position. By contrast, although rationales plainly influence
the course of case law, to ignore such a rationale generally is viewed as less
damaging to the concept of stare decisis.
One corollary of these principles is that the development of the law under
the commerce clause is somewhat atypical; more commonly, when there is a
clear conflict between a doctrine and a rationale, the former will prevail. Here
the alienage cases provide an excellent example. Soon after the decision in Gra-
69. See, e.g., Varat, State "Citizenship"and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 487, 503-08
(1981); Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA.
L. REV. 1073, 1124-35 (1980). But see Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much: An Examination
of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 67-69 (1981) (stating that Hughes
and Reeves were correctly decided).
70. See, e.g., Varat, supra note 69, at 505; Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 69, at 1129; Note,
State Purchasing Activity Excluded From Commerce Clause Review-Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 893, 921-22 (1977) (stating that the decision in Hughes runs
counter to prior well-reasoned Supreme Court precedent in the commerce clause area).
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ham, the Court was faced with Nyquist v. Mauclet.71 At issue in Mauclet was a
New York statute that limited participation in a state scholarship program to
citizens and aliens who either had applied for citizenship or, if not currently
eligible for citizenship, had certified they would apply when eligible.72 As the
dissent pointed out, the class discriminated against was not "discrete and insu-
lar"; its members could escape the class whenever they chose to do SO. 7 3 None-
theless, applying the s eemingly unqualified doctrine of Graham, a majority of
the Court held that New York could not enforce the discrimination against a
subclass of aliens.74 Thus, the Court plainly preferred the Graham doctrine to
the rationale announced in that case.
Moreover, even in cases in which doctrine is unclear, rationales often are
ignored or distorted. The opinion in Plyler reflects the general approach toward
the use of rationales as authority. Unlike the Graham line of cases, Plyler in-
volved a claim that discrimination against illegal aliens violated the fourteenth
amendment. 75 The majority opinion clearly recognized that such discrimination
raised different issues than that decided in Graham.76 The opinion also noted,
however, that in cases striking down discrimination against illegitimates the
Court had relied heavily on the theory that it is fundamentally unjust to punish
individuals on the basis of a characteristic over which they have no control.77
Noting that children of illegal aliens clearly constituted such a class, the Court
relied on this observation in holding the challenged discrimination unconstitu-
tional in Plyler.78
If one were faced only with the bare holding in Plyler, she might well con-
clude that the force of rationales in judicial decision making was very strong
indeed. The structure of the opinion, however, creates a very different impres-
sion. The majority plainly viewed the illegitimacy cases as simply suggestive,
rather than controlling. Indeed, as already noted, the Court explicitly limited its
holding to the issue of education; the majority implied that in other circum-
stances, discrimination against the children of illegal aliens might be subject only
to the rational basis test.79 Therefore, the overall message of Plyler is not that
the rationales of prior cases are to be given the same respect as doctrine. How-
ever much weight such rationales are to be given in the judicial decision making
process, only doctrine itself is formally protected by the concept of stare decisis.
In short, although the factors determining the scope of a precedent case are
diverse, they fall into a fairly clear hierarchy. The most powerful precepts are
those of general doctrine, followed by the elements of specific doctrine. Typi-
cally, the rationale of a case assumes great importance only when the impact of
71. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
72. Id. at 3-4.
73. See id. at 17-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 12.
75. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982); see supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
76. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227-30.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 218-20.
79. See id. at 223-25.
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the other factors is unclear. Even in those cases, judges will more readily ignore
rationales than either general or specific doctrine.
In any event, any precedent case is always subject to at least the possibility
that it will be overruled, rendering the discussion of the scope of the precedent
irrelevant. The remainder of this Article discusses the concept of overruling
precedents.
III. OVERRULING AND MODIFYING PRECEDENTS
A. General Principles
Because of the dynamics of the judicial decision making process, the pro-
cess must contain some mechanism for discarding precedents in order to func-
tion properly. Indeed, in some circumstances the operation of the doctrine of
stare decisis itself is enhanced by such a mechanism. In situations in which the
relevant doctrine is vague, early interpretations of that doctrine are likely to
generate somewhat inconsistent results. As the number of interpretations ac-
cumulates, however, a clearer picture of the dominant approach should emerge.
By overruling earlier cases inconsistent with this dominant approach, the court
can eliminate confusion in the law.
The overruling of Morey v. Doud 80 by the Supreme Court is a good illustra-
tion of this point. In Doud, plaintiffs challenged the validity of a provision of the
Illinois Currency Exchange Act, which excepted the American Express Com-
pany from a requirement that any firm selling or issuing money orders in the
State secure a license and submit to State regulation. In response to an equal
protection challenge to this statute, the Court found that the granting of special
treatment to American Express was unconstitutional because the classification
lacked a rational basis.8 1
As the jurisprudence of the rational basis test developed, Doud emerged as
an anomaly in an otherwise unbroken line of cases that left the states generally
free to make classifications in cases involving purely economic regulations.
Nonetheless, so long as Doud remained a viable precedent, it confused those who
(for whatever reason) needed to understand the constitutional constraints im-
posed by the equal protection clause. This confusion was evident in the lower
courts, which at times relied on Doud in striking down local business regula-
tions.82 By overruling Doud in City of New Orleans v. Dukes,8 3 the Supreme
Court ameliorated this confusion and thus removed an obstacle to the efficient
functioning of the doctrine of stare decisis.
Respect for stare decisis is not, however, the sole or even the primary rea-
son why courts diverge from prior case law. Although it is a powerful force in
80. 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled by City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per
curiam).
81. Id. at 466-69.
82. See, eg., City of Miami v. Woolin, 387 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir. 1968); Mayhue v. City of
Plantation, 375 F.2d 447, 450-51 (5th Cir. 1967).
83. 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976) (per curiam).
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the decision making process, the concept of respect for precedent must compete
with other values respected by judges. Often this competition ends with some
modification of the doctrine or rationale that underlies a seemingly relevant pre-
cedent; on rarer occasions a troublesome precedent is abandoned entirely or re-
stricted to its facts.
Even in the latter context, however, the force of the concept of precedent is
such that judges generally wish to appear to be following a course consistent
with prior case law. They often solve the problem by restating the doctrine or
rationale of the precedential case in a way that is consistent with the desired
result in the later case. As Huntington demonstrates, at times this device can be
used in a good faith attempt to explicate the doctrine of the precedential case. In
other situations, however, courts simply are trying to avoid the appearance of
ignoring the rule of stare decisis.
One problem with this dichotomy is that it often is difficult to determine
whether a court is deliberately altering preexisting doctrine or making a good
faith effort to interpret prior case law. Particularly on a multimember tribunal
such as the Supreme Court, the two elements are likely to be mixed. The treat-
ment of the Graham doctrine in Sugarman v. Dougal184 and Ambach v.
Norwick 85 illustrates this difficulty. In Sugarman the Court held that a New
York statute barring aliens from all government employment violated the equal
protection clause.8 6 In so doing, the majority applied the Graham analysis to
the challenged classification and thus subjected the state law to strict scrutiny.8 7
The Sugarman opinion was careful to note, however, that the rule would not
apply to citizenship classifications for suffrage or "persons holding state elective
or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers
who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy functions that go to the heart of representative government."8 8 The ma-
jority noted that the authority to exclude aliens from such positions derives from
the power and duty of the state" 'to preserve the basic conception of a political
community.' "89
Sugarman itself established a significant exception to the principles an-
nounced in Graham'. The exception, however, plainly constituted a good faith
interpretation of the intentions of the members of the Graham majority. One
clear indication is the fact that seven members of the Graham majority partici-
pated in Sugarman, and all concurred without comment in the formulation of
the exception in the latter. On its face the exception seemed rather narrow,
apparently establishing a policymaking/nonpolicymaking dichotomy for classifi-
cations based on alienage. If a position involved the formulation of broad poli-
cies or the selection of those who would make such policies, then restrictions
based on citizenship would have to pass only a rational basis test. In all other
84. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
85. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
86. 413 U.S. at 646.
87. See id. at 647.
88. Id. at 647-49.
89. Id. at 647 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
[Vol. 66
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
cases strict scrutiny would apply to exclusions of aliens from public
employment.
The majority in Ambach took a different view, however. Ambach was a
challenge to a state statute forbidding certification of aliens as public school
teachers. Under the Sugarman approach, strict scrutiny seemed appropriate;
however important their function, teachers plainly are not policymakers. None-
theless, five Justices in Ambach held the rational basis test to be the appropriate
standard. 90 They argued that the relevant question was whether teachers per-
formed a "governmental function" or a "'fundamental obligation of govern-
ment to its constituency.' "91 Given the "importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals as citizens," 92 the Ambach majority found the ra-
tional basis test the appropriate standard of review and held the citizenship re-
quirement constitutional.
On its face the Ambach opinion seems to represent a deliberate attempt to
cut back on the clear import of Sugarman by intentionally misstating the doc-
trine of the latter. Indeed, one noted commentator confidently predicted that
Ambach presaged the overruling of Sugarman itself.93 But contextual factors
suggest that this analysis is simplistic. Three of the five members of the Ambach
majority had concurred in Sugarman and never renounced allegiance to the
principles of that majority opinion.94 Moreover, Justice Powell-the author of
the majority opinion in Ambach-thereafter repeatedly emphasized the central-
ity of education in a variety of contexts. 95 Thus, it seems likely that for at least
some of the Justices, Ambach simply was an idiosyncratic but good faith attempt
to interpret the Sugarman doctrine. By contrast, other members of the Ambach
majority-Justices Rehnquist and Stewart-had evinced general dissatisfaction
with the basic Sugarman analysis of discrimination based on alienage. 96 They
were no doubt willing to seize any device to restrict the scope of that analysis.
Such ambiguities necessarily created substantial uncertainty regarding the post-
Ambach status of Sugarman as a precedent.
Subsequently, the Court emphatically reaffirmed the basic Sugarman rule in
Bernal v. Fainter.97 Bernal was a challenge to a California statute which pro-
vided that only citizens could be appointed notaries public. Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court struck down the statute, noting that "a notary's duties, im-
portant as they are, hardly implicate responsibilities that go to the heart of rep-
90. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80-81.
91. Id. at 76 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)).
92. Id.
93. See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1023, 1064-65 (1979).
94. The three were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and White.
95. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236-41 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring); San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (discussing the constitutionality of a
school financing system, with Justice Powell writing for the majority).
96. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Sugarman, 413
U.S. at 649-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
resentative government." 98 Every still-active member of the Sugarman majority
joined the opinion of the Court.
The Court's zig-zag course from Sugarman to Bernal has engendered con-
siderable uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of many restrictions on the
rights of aliens. Such uncertainties could have been avoided, or at least amelio-
rated, if the Court had directly and forthrightly addressed prior case law and
either overruled the relevant doctrine or limited its scope in some manner. In
other contexts, judges adopt this forthright approach when two elements con-
join. First, the judge must believe that following existing doctrine would
threaten other important values-values more important than those underlying
the doctrine of stare decisis itself. Second, the judge must conclude that to adopt
an Ambach-type solution in the particular case before her would either be incon-
sistent with general principles of judicial candor or rest on a distinction that
would be facially implausible.
The issues presented by the first element of this analysis are central to an
understanding of the power of precedent in the American legal system. Judges
vary substantially on the question of what values are sufficiently compelling to
justify the abandonment of prior doctrine. However, two general themes recur
throughout the case law. The first is the principle of the supremacy of statutes.
The second is the relative significance of common-law, statutory, and constitu-
tional precedents.
B. The Supremacy of Statutes
Theoretically, the influence of preexisting precedents ceases upon passage of
a statute that is applicable to a particular situation. In interpreting the statute,
the court is expected to seek "the intent of the legislature," applying conventions
entirely different from those which govern the doctrine of stare decisis. In fact,
however, prior case law continues to influence judicial decision making even
when a relevant statute has intervened.
This influence is most pervasive in the definition of terms used in statutes.
In drafting laws, legislatures act against the background of the existing body of
case law. Thus, in seeking to ascertain the intended meaning of words used in
legislation, courts naturally turn to the definitions established in that case law.
Common-law doctrine also influences the interpretation of statutes in some
cases in which the language of the written law seems on its face to displace that
doctrine. Judges at times strain to preserve precedents that they believe estab-
lish just rules. This tendency is readily discernible in the maxim that "statutes
which are in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed." 99
Kaiser v. Kaiser 10 0 provides an excellent example of the operation of this
maxim. Kaiser involved the interpretation of a New York statute making par-
ents responsible for the support of children under the age of twenty-one who are,
98. Id. at 225.
99. E.g., Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
100. 93 Misc. 2d 36, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1978).
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or are prospects for, receiving public assistance. The statute also provided that
"'[s]tep-parents shall in like manner be responsible for the support of children
under the age of twenty-one years.' "101 At issue was a petition for support filed
by a child against a stepmother whose husband, the child's father, had died.
The petitioner argued that under New York law, the death of the father did
not terminate the stepchild relationship.1 0 2 Given this position, the language of
the statute seemed to make the stepmother clearly liable for the support re-
quested. Nonetheless, the court denied the petition. Noting that the relevant
provision was in derogation of the common law and thus should be strictly con-
strued, the court relied on the absence of specific language that would extend the
obligation of the stepparent beyond the death of the natural parent.10 3 In so
doing the court placed the statute in the context of existing common law rather
than reaching the result that, in isolation, the clear statutory language seemed to
require.
The same forces can operate to preserve the power of case law interpreting
statutes even when that case law has seemingly been superseded by amendments
to the statutes. The California experience with civil rights statutes is illustrative.
An 1897 state law provided that "all citizens... shall be entitled to the full and
equal [use of] all ... places of public accommodation or amusement, subject
only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to
all citizens."'104 Interpreting this statute in Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club 10 5
and Stoumen v. Reilly,10 6 the California Supreme Court held that under this
statute "[m]embers of the public.., have a right to patronize a public [establish-
ment] so long as they are acting properly and are not committing illegal or im-
moral acts; the proprietor has no right to exclude or eject a patron 'except for
good cause.' "107 Thus, the statute barred a race track from expelling a patron
who had acquired a reputation as a man of immoral character10 8 and established
the right of homosexuals to obtain food and drink in a bar and restaurant. 109
In 1959 the state legislature amended the statute to provide that "[a]ll citi-
zens ... are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ances-
try, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations ... in
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."' 110 On its face, this
amendment seemed to supersede Orloff and Stoumen by limiting the applicabil-
ity of the statute to specified types of discrimination. Nonetheless, in In re
101. Id. at 38, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 171-73 (quoting N.Y. Jun. LAW § 415 (McKinney 1983)).
102. Id. at 38, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
103. Id. at 39-40, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
104. Act of March 13, 1897, cl. 108, § 1, 1897 Cal. Stat. 137 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 51
(1901)).
105. 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951).
106. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
107. Id. at 716, 234 P.2d at 971 (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (1901)).
108. Orloff, 36 Cal. 2d at 740-42, 227 P.2d at 453-54.
109. Stoutnen, 37 Cal. 2d at 716-17, 234 P.2d at 971.
110. Unruh Civil Rights Act, ch. 1866, § 1, 1959 Cal. Stat. 4424 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 51 (West 1982)).
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Cox 1 the court applied this statute to prohibit discrimination against a person
"who wore long hair and dressed in an unconventional manner.", 12 Holding
that "identification of particular bases of discrimination is illustrative rather
than restrictive" and that "[t]he Legislature intended to prohibit all arbitrary
discrimination by business establishments,"'1 3 the court continued:
We cannot infer from the 1959 amendment any legislative intent to
deprive citizens in general of the rights declared by the [predecessor]
statute and sanctioned by public policy. "Without the most cogent
and convincing evidence, a court will never attribute to the Legislature
the intent to disregard or overturn a sound rule of public policy.""114
Thus, once again the doctrines established by the courts prior to the passage of a
statute had a strong influence on the judicial interpretation of that statute.
Of course, this is not to say that statutes never have the effect of abrogating
prior doctrine. The point is that the mere fact the legislature has acted does not
totally extinguish the influence of prestatutory judge-made law. Instead, legisla-
tive action simply changes the dynamic, with preexisting doctrine being one of a
number of factors that influence judicial interpretation of the relevant statute.
C. Common-Law, Statutory, and Constitutional Precedents
Courts often assert that the doctrine of stare decisis has varying force, de-
pending on the specific type of precedent involved. Common-law precedents
provide the benchmark against which other case law is measured. Typically,
precedents relying on statutory interpretation are viewed as more sacrosanct
than their common-law counterparts. By contrast, the doctrine of stare decisis
often is described as less important in the constitutional context than in that of
either pure judge-made law or statutory interpretation.
Discussions of these principles often rely heavily on the ability of the legis-
lature to correct judicial "mistakes." When discussing their extraordinary reluc-
tance to overturn statute-based precedents, judges often cite the ability of the
legislature to reverse erroneous interpretations of legislative intent.' 15 Con-
versely, the perceived invulnerability of judicial interpretations of the Constitu-
tion is generally viewed as the main justification for taking a more flexible
attitude toward overruling precedent in such cases.' 16
In the statutory context, the legislative correction rationale is clearly over-
stated. In its strongest form, the argument is that legislative silence suggests the
judicial decision correctly reflects the intention of the legislature. The majority
111. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970) (en banc).
112. Id. at 210, 474 P.2d at 994, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
113. Id. at 216, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
114. Id. at 215, 474 P.2d at 998, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (quoting Interinsurance Exchnage v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 152, 373 P.2d 640, 645, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597 (1962).
115. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240 (1970).
116. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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in Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara City1 17 recently captured
the essence of this argument: " 'When a court says to a legislature: "You (or
your predecessor) meant X," it almost invites the legislature to answer: "We did
not." )118
Admittedly, the legislature is free to correct statutory precedents it views as
erroneous. For example, when the Supreme Court held in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert 119 that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not outlaw dis-
crimination based on pregnancy, Congress moved quickly to reverse the deci-
sion.' 20 As a number of commentators have noted, however, the fact the
legislature fails to overrule a judicial interpretation of a statute does not guaran-
tee that the interpretation accurately reflects the intention of the legislature
which enacted the statute.12 1 The inappropriateness of relying on legislative in-
action in this regard can be traced to a number of factors. First, the relevant
intent in interpreting a statute is that of the legislature which enacted the stat-
ute-a body whose composition might well have changed significantly by the
time a judicial interpretation has been handed down. Given such a change, the
judicial action might be contrary to the intention of the enacting legislature, but
entirely consistent with the biases of a majority of current legislators. In such a
case, one would not expect the judicial error to be corrected.
More importantly, any judicial decision will be protected by the phenome-
non of legislative inertia. Even if the majority of legislators believe a judicial
decision is wrong, any number of factors might prevent the legislature from act-
ing on that belief. For example, parliamentary maneuvering might block the
will of the majority, legislators might trade off their votes for support on unre-
lated issues, or the matter addressed by the judicial decision might be viewed as
too insignificant to occupy the time of a busy legislature. Thus, even in the
absence of a significant change in the makeup of the legislature, there is no guar-
antee that an erroneous judicial interpretation of a statute will be corrected.
This point is well illustrated by congressional inaction in the face of both
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson 122 and Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770.123 Both Sinclair Refining and Boys Markets dealt with the
interaction between the Norris-LaGuardia Act 124 and section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA).125 Norris-LaGuardia generally prohibits
the federal courts from issuing injunctions against labor strikes. Conversely,
117. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
118. Id. at 1451 n.7 (quoting G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-
32 (1982)).
119. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
120. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1982)).
121. See, eg., Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1472-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1386-87 (tenta-
tive ed. 1958).
122. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
123. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1973).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1978).
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section 301 of the LMRA, as interpreted in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills 126 and its progeny, gives the federal courts authority to interpret collective
bargaining agreements and, when appropriate, to order arbitration of labor dis-
putes arising under such agreements. The question in Sinclair Refining and Boys
Markets was whether section 301 should be interpreted to create an exception
to the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition, and thus empower federal courts to enjoin
strikes that violate no-strike provisions in collective bargaining agreements. In
Sinclair Refining, the Court held that no such exception had been created. 127
Boys Markets, however, overruled Sinclair Refining and held that section 301
had in fact modified the prohibition on labor injunctions. 128
Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, either Sinclair Refining
or Boys Markets must have been incorrectly decided-that is, Congress either
intended to create an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition, or it did
not. Yet Congress took no action to reverse either decision. Such inaction dra-
matically illustrates the unreliability of legislative inaction as a measure of the
correctness of a judicial interpretation of a statute.
Given the inadequacy of the rationale based on the possibility of legislative
correction, the special status of statutory precedents must reflect some other
value. Edward Levi makes a weaker claim to justify a special status for statu-
tory precedents. Levi suggests that maintenance of such precedents is necessary
to preserve the proper relationship between the courts and the legislature:
Legislatures and courts are cooperative law-making bodies. It is impor-
tant to know where the responsibility lies. If legislation which is disfa-
vored can be interpreted away from time to time, then it is not to be
expected, particularly if controversy is high, that the legislature will
ever act. It will always be possible to say that new legislation is not
needed because the court in the future will make a more appropriate
interpretation. If the court is to have freedom to reinterpret legisla-
tion, the result will be to relieve the legislature from pressure. The
legislation needs judicial consistency. Moreover, the court's own be-
havior in the face of pressure is likely to be indecisive. In all likelihood
it will do enough to prevent legislative revision and not much more. 129
Levi's explanation justifies respect for precedent generally in cases of statu-
tory interpretation. It does not, however, differentiate statutes from the com-
mon law. Pure judge-made law also is subject to legislative modification. For
example, in many states in which the courts themselves have not replaced the
common-law rule of pure contributory negligence with some form of analysis
based on comparative negligence, the same change has been accomplished by
statute. 130 Further, legislators are no more likely to embrace controversial is-
sues in areas currently governed by common law than in those controlled by
126. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
127. 370 U.S. at 213-15.
128. 398 U.S. at 253-55.
129. E. LEvI, supra note 2, at 32.
130. See P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 471-
74 (5th ed. 1984).
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statutes. Thus, if the purpose of the doctrine of stare decisis is to force legisla-
tors to confront their responsibility to effectuate the public interest, then com-
mon-law precedents should have the same force as precedents interpreting
statutes.
On its face, the argument for less stringent application of the doctrine of
stare decisis in the constitutional context seems more persuasive. In this context
the analysis rests on the established doctrine of judicial supremacy in constitu-
tional interpretation. Given the inability of the legislature to override judge-
made law in this area, it is argued that when an earlier decision is demonstrably
wrong, it is incumbent on courts to defer "to the lessons of experience and the
force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruit-
ful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function,"' 131 and
to overrule the erroneous precedent.
This argument has its greatest force in situations in which the court has
adopted an activist posture-for example, when the decision to be overruled
held some government action to be unconstitutional. In Lochner v. New York 
132
the Supreme Court held that laws setting the maximum number of hours that
bakers could be required to work violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Thus, so long as the case remained good law, no legislature
could adopt such a law and have it enforced. Only after Lochner was over-
ruled 133 did maximum hour regulations become generally viable.
The situation is quite different, however, when the controlling precedent
finds the challenged practice not to be inconsistent with the relevant constitu-
tional constraints. In those cases, the legislature can effectively neutralize the
constitutional holding by adopting a new statute. The interaction between Con-
gress and the Supreme Court on the issue of the relevance of disparate racial
impact to voting rights analysis illustrates this point. In City of Mobile v.
Bolden 134 the Court held that disparate racial impact alone was insufficient to
support a holding that an apportionment scheme violated the fifteenth amend-
ment. In response to this decision, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to
provide specifically that such an impact was a relevant factor in assessing the
legality of apportionment plans. 135 Thus, the importance of City of Mobile was
substantially reduced. 136
Of course, the amendment of the statute did not have precisely the same
impact as would a reversal of City of.Mobile. The statute could be repealed, but
an analogous judicial decision could only be changed by constitutional amend-
ment. On this point, however, a statute "reversing" a constitutional decision
131. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
133. Identifying the precise date at which Lochner was formally overruled is surprisingly diffi-
cult. However, the case was clearly moribund by 1963. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-
31(1963).
134. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
135. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1985)).
136. The Court itself further limited the impact of City of Mobile in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613 (1982).
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stands on precisely the same footing as legislative action changing a common-
law rule. Thus, to distinguish nonactivist constitutional precedents from com-
mon-law decisions on the basis of legislative reversibility seems unsound. 137
In short, attempts to rely on tangible factors to justify the different degrees
of respect accorded to different types of precedent are unpersuasive. Instead, the
divergent attitudes toward stare decisis can be traced to very basic perceptions
regarding the judicial function in common-law, statutory, and constitutional liti-
gation, respectively. In cases of statutory construction, the initial judicial deci-
sion on an issue is viewed as the final and necessary step in the legislative process
itself. Although the legislature passes a statute without the direct intervention of
the judiciary, the rights created by the statute remain largely inchoate and to
some degree uncertain until a court interprets the new law. Once the initial
interpretation is rendered, however, all steps necessary to effectuate the legisla-
tive scheme have been taken. Not only has the statute been passed, but the
rights established by the statute have been fixed. Because alteration of the rights
established by the legislature is a legislative rather than a judicial function, judi-
cial alteration of a prevailing statutory interpretation can be viewed as a usurpa-
tion of authority. A Georgia court captured the essence of the values underlying
the unusually powerful force of statutorily based precedent:
It is true that "stare decisis" is a matter of judicial policy rather than
judicial power. In this regard the common law is not immutable, but
flexible, and upon its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.
However, even those who regard "stare decisis" with something less
than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has even greater weight
where the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute. Once the
court interprets the statute, "the interpretation.., has become an inte-
gral part of the statute." This having been done, any subsequent "rein-
terpretation" would be no different in effect from a judicial alteration
of language that the General Assembly itself placed in the statute. 138
Analogous concerns are reflected in the decision to accord precedent less
weight in the constitutional context. Constitutional decision making operates on
a variety of different levels. On one level, a decision holding that a particular
course of action is constitutional simply permits that course of action to be con-
tinued. On another level, the same decision places a kind of moral imprimatur
on the challenged government activity, declaring it to be not inconsistent with
the document that establishes the basic parameters within which government
operates.139 Legislative change can alter the course of action; it cannot, how-
ever, remove the moral imprimatur. Thus, even in this context, constitutional
137. See Maltz, supra note 2, at 371; Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
353, 389-90 (1981).
138. Walker v. Walker, 122 Ga. App. 545, 546, 178 S.E.2d 46, 46-47 (1970) (quoting Gulf v.
Moser, 275 U.S. 133, 136 (1927)); see also Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 257-258 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (Court should reverse statutorily based precedent
only in extraordinary circumstances).
139. See generally Levinson, The Constitution in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV.
123 (proposing that the Constitution is a "sacred text" that provides Americans with a civil
religion).
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precedent arguably should be treated differently than its common-law
counterpart.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than being a simple, easily defined monolith, the doctrine of stare
decisis is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon whose diverse components reflect
a variety of values. Such phenomena typically defy full and accurate descrip-
tion. Nonetheless, by isolating and examining the various elements comprising
the concept of precedent, we can deepen our understanding of the way in which
that concept influences the judicial decision making process. This Article has
focused on some of these elements. It is not intended to provide a complete
picture of the operation of stare decisis. It is hoped, however, that the analysis
has both clarified some critical points and provided a useful framework for fur-
ther study.

